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POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, CAMPAIGN
FINANCE, AND REGULATORY REFORM
MICHAEL WALDMAN*

Michael Waldman argues that campaign finance laws are ripe
for reconsideration. First, the Supreme Court of the United States'
recent decision in Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission has
created numerous unexpected consequences, despite the case's young
age. Second, the advent of political action committees (PACs), nonprofit 501(c) (4)s, and other politically motivated entities poses a threat
to both Democrats and Republicans alike, opening the doorfor reform.
And, lastly, Waldman discusses plausible regulatoryreforms, ultimately
recommending a reform measure that provides public funds to match,
by a set ratio, small donor contributions to participatingpolitical
candidates. Mr. Waldman asserts that this reform will boost the power
of the small donors, without seeking to reducepolitical spending overall
or pretending that it will end the power of big money contributions.
Ultimately, Waldman concludes by emphasizing the need for Citizens
United to be overturned.
I. INTRODUCTION

I come to this issue from at least two perspectives that I want to
lay out for you. The Brennan Center for Justice is affiliated with the
New York University School of Law, and we are deeply engaged in the
study of - and litigation around - campaign finance rules and the
constitutional dimensions thereof. Also, in my previous life, I served as
the policy aide in the White House working on campaign finance reform
in the 1990s. I have been throwing the bricks and ducking from them as
well; and, this underscores for me what I hope we can add to the
discussion. The financial deregulation of the past several decades took
place under a campaign finance rule regime that is no longer in
* Michael Waldman has served as President of the Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University School of Law since 2005, and is a leader in the fields of election law and
government reform. Waldman previously served as a top White House policy aide on
campaign finance reform as Assistant to the President for President Bill Clinton.
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existence. It took place in the context of accelerating deregulation of
political money. Now, what we have seen in the last few years
approaches a complete deregulation of the role of private money in
elections, which will begin to play out in a variety of ways in all the
issues raised in this conference.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION

How money affects politics and how money in elections affects
policy are among the oldest questions in American life. We have a
capitalist economy. We want the benefits of a robust market system, and
we recognize that this will inevitably create concentrations of capital
and wealth; but, we want the benefits of that system, nonetheless. We
want the benefits of a democracy, which is rooted in a very different
ethic of one-person, one-vote. We know that there may be conflicts
between those two sets of values that we have to try to resolve as a
society by drawing lines.
The first significant campaign finance law created the civil
service. In the late 1800s, before the rise of corporate capitalism, the
way you paid for your campaigns was to make the federal employees
pay for it. Later, the first federal campaign law relating to corporations,
the Tillman Act, was passed in response to an undisclosed contribution
from a financial institution to the reelection campaign of Theodore
Roosevelt. When it was revealed in the last days of that campaign in
1904, it was such a huge controversy, and Roosevelt was so
embarrassed and aghast, that he said there would be a "riotous, wicked,
murderous day of atonement" if we did not do something about
campaign financing.
A.

The Citizens United Decision

These issues are not new. We have gone back and forth on
them, and I do not want to pretend that everything was halcyon ten or
twenty years ago. However, as a society, we have drawn these lines
through our democratic process. Then, just three years ago, the United
States Supreme Court redrew those lines. They erased the existing line
and redrew it in a very different place with the Citizens United v.
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Federal Election Commission' decision. This case followed from a
series of decisions, starting with Buckley v. Valeo 2 , but accelerating
under the Roberts Court, that deregulated campaign finance with a very
constricted and even fetishized notion of what the First Amendment
requires. Citizens United was just as significant, I would argue, as
people have said it is. It is important to understand what Citizens United
actually says. It does not say, in contrast to the bumper stickers,
"Corporations are people." It says that it does not matter whether
corporations are people when looking at the campaign spending that
they can do. Of course, the most significant holding was that you could
no longer bar the making of independent expenditures by corporations
in individual elections. Citizens United also said something that turned
out to have an even more dramatic consequence, which was Justice
Kennedy's statement, as a matter of law not fact, that there could be no
corrupting consequence from corporate independent expenditures. 3
Some of us thought or hoped that was dicta, but it turned out to be more
significant in the short-run than the part of the ruling that dealt with
corporations versus natural persons.
B.

Citizens United Raises New Concerns

Citizens United was significant, and not surprisingly, has given
us progeny-new cases throughout the court system implementing it,
extending it, and expanding on its logic. The most important one,
SpeechNOWorg v. FederalElection Commission,4 said if there can be
no corruption from independent expenditures, then there cannot be
limits on contributions from corporations or anyone else to PACS
making independent political expenditures. 5 This is just the first major
1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding, in part,
that the First Amendment is violated by a requirement which prohibited electioneering
communications funded by independent corporate expenditures).
2. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that the First Amendment is violated
by a law limiting campaign spending and prohibiting independent expenditures, but is not
violated by requirements which limit individual campaign contributions).
3. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010) ("[T]his Court now concludes that
independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption.").
4. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
5. Id. (holding, in part, that the First Amendment is violated by requirements which
limit individual contributions to exclusively independent expenditures of political
committees).
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case of many going through the federal courts brought by the same
people who brought Citizens United, seeking to encourage the Court to
deregulate as much of the political rules as they can. This may
ultimately yield complete deregulation because of the court cases, the
lack of action by the Federal Election Commission, and trends in the
political marketplace have led to an anything goes era. But, even if you
take a less dramatic view, you now have a situation where candidates
are increasingly dwarfed as the actors in the political system by outside
forces. In this last election, where between six and seven billion dollars
were spent, about half was spent by candidates and their committees.
The other half was spent by super PACs, party committees, and by
"dark money," or undisclosed outsized spending by non-profit
501(c)(4)s. This is a phenomenon that is terrifying to candidates and
incumbent politicians of both parties, which can create some
opportunities for doing something about it. One question I frequently
heard from journalists, especially right after the election, was, "Mitt
Romney lost. Didn't the Super PACs not 'work'?" I do not think this is
the right question to ask, at least not now. For starters, this is not only a
challenge for one party. Even more so, I quote the famous line from
Zhou Enlai, the Communist Chinese Premier, when he was asked what
he thought of the French revolution: "Well, it is too soon to tell." We
have only had one presidential election and one midterm election since
Citizens United. We can see already the kinds of things that did not
happen yet. First, there was not much direct corporate spending in
campaigns as some people feared. It is true that they found out they did
not have to spend directly, i.e., they could give to these other entities
such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. But, I would suggest it also
just reflects a social norm. Right now, it is controversial. But the first
time someone does it and lives to tell the tale, it will not be a problem
anymore. We are just starting to see the melding of lobbying with Super
PACs. We have not seen, until this past month, the essential outsourcing
of an entire political campaign and a political party, to the new
501(c)(4) organization, Organizing for Action, that the Obama
campaign has created to carry on its work. They will be lobbying on
issues, but it creates a new precedent that is very worrisome.
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III. PROPOSED REFORM TO EXISTING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS
So, what can we do about it? Let me suggest that there are both
immediate regulatory pressure points, legislative solutions, as well as
longer term jurisprudential challenges.
A.

RegulatoryPressurePoints

There are things in the short-run that administrative agencies
and elsewhere can do, at the very least, to improve disclosure. Justice
Anthony Kennedy, in his opinion in Citizens United, premised the
ruling on the idea that everything would be disclosed. Of course, we
now know that less and less is disclosed. So, the Securities and
Exchange Commission has begun to move forward with rulemaking.
And you have actors in the states, especially attorney generals, that can
potentially have a significant role. The Attorney General of New York,
subpoenaed
information from 501(c)(4)
Eric Schneiderman,
organizations, and has proposed rules requiring 501(c)(4)s operating in
New York making political expenditures over $10,000 to publicly
disclose their donors. That would be quite significant, and there are
forty-nine other states and their attorneys general that could do that as
well. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in its discreet
way, has required disclosure electronically of the records of broadcast
television stations, which turned out to be controversial with the
broadcast industry.
The two agencies that have been silent throughout all of this are
the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which is barely functional, and
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). I need someone who is far more
fluent in tax law to explain to me why the IRS had to wait for the
Attorney General of New York to do something about 501(c)(4)
organizations that are basically political committees rather than
charities. Those are the regulatory pressure points. They exist, but are
limited in their impact.
B.

A Novel Proposal:A Variation ofSmall Donor Matching Funds

There is another response that my organization, the Brennan
Center for Justice, is deeply involved in. It does not pretend to solve all
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of the problems of money in politics, but it is a revival and a re-thinking
of how to implement public financing. Voluntary public financing is
still constitutional. The Supreme Court of the United States heard a case
on this question last year, which the Brennan Center litigated. The Barry
Goldwater Institute had argued that Arizona's public financing system
was unconstitutional because it chilled the speech of non-participating
candidates. By the time the Court took the case, that question had been
narrowed down to whether there were triggers in the law in Arizona
where if you are a participating candidate facing a non-participating
candidate, a wealthy individual, or someone who just raised a lot of
money, you receive extra public financing. And, the Court said in the
Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett6 case that

that trigger was unconstitutional because it potentially chilled the
speech of the non-participating candidate. That was not the view that we
wanted them to take. But they also said unanimously that voluntary
public financing is still constitutional. And, the version of public
financing with the most momentum, and about which I am most excited
about, does not pretend that it is getting all the money out of politics but
actually seeks to boost spending and participation. It is a version of
small donor matching funds similar to the system in New York City and
now Los Angeles. In New York City, a small contribution to a city
council or mayoral candidate is matched by the public fund six-to-one.
New Federal versions of public financing being discussed would have a
smaller match, two-to-one or four-to-one. But as it has in New York, it
would change the mix of who contributes, fuse organizing with
fundraising in a new way, and boost the Internet-fueled rise of small
donors.
In a way, there are two big trends in campaign finance. One is
the new ways big money is coming in, and the other is the new ways
small money is coming in. And, the change in how money is spent
would help small money because thirty-second ads are losing ground to
social media, which makes it cheaper to run campaigns. So, the purpose
of this proposal in effect is to boost the power of the small donors, not
to stop the big money, but to create a potential alternative. It is
6. Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
7. Id. at 2827 ("We have said that a voluntary system of 'public financing as a means
of eliminating the improper influence of large private contributions furthers a significant
governmental interest."') (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96 (1976)).
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constitutional, it has worked in a lot of places, and it is something that is
starting to be talked about a lot in Congress. Governor Andrew Cuomo
has made a very big push for this in New York as his next big piece of
legislation that he is seeking to enact.
Those are the short-term pressure points, with the very
significant impact coming from small donor public financing.
C.

The Need for a FavorableJudicialLandscape

But in the long run-and this is one way our work at the
Brennan Center for Justice comes in-we need a different
jurisprudential approach to these issues to be adopted by the Supreme
Court. We are all used to seeing campaign finance regulation as plainly
and obviously a First Amendment issue in which judges apply strict
scrutiny. In fact, it is a very recent phenomenon, since Buckley v. Valeo
in 1976, that laws that would otherwise have been deemed
anticorruption laws are suddenly treated that way. The Court now seems
to feel that corruption is very narrowly defined, and that you cannot
have corruption from the signaling that occurs between independent
spenders and governmental actors. Justice Roberts, in his questioning
during oral arguments in Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club
PAC, even seemed to imply that if a public financing system had the
incidental side-effect of boosting political equality, that might
potentially be enough to make it unconstitutional, even if the rest of it
was constitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION
So, we are working with a number of scholars and litigators
from around the country to build a long-term drive to overturn Citizens
United, just as there was a drive to enact it. We are looking at what
corruption really means, and what the framers really meant by
corruption; in other words, corruption was not just handing someone a
check. What are the speech rights of voters in hearing both sides? How
can we boost speech without it being seen as chilling other peoples'
speech? Can speech drown out someone else's speech, and what can
you do about that? Is political equality a value that ought to be built into
the way we look at the Constitution? The justices have accepted
federalism as a Constitutional value, and they have accepted checks-
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and-balances as a Constitutional value. But, as Justice Breyer has
written and said, they need to accept democracy, a strong democracy, as
a Constitutional value too, or we are not going to have one. Recently,
Justice Scalia said that he thought the Constitution was "dead, dead,
dead." 8 What he meant was that his notion of originalism requires us to
only look at the words on the page. We have to find a way to keep the
democracy "alive, alive, alive," so that is our long-term goal.

8. Tasha Tsiaperas, Constitution a 'dead, dead, deal' document, Scalia tells SMU
Audience,
DALLAS
MORNING
NEWS
(Jan.
28,
2013,
11:08
PM),
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-news/park-cities/headlines/20130128supreme-court-justice-scalia-offers-perspective-on-the-law-at-smu-lecture.ece.

